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HODGSON v. ROBERT HALL CLOTHES, INC.:
CONCEALED SEX .DISCRIMINATION
AND THE EQUAL PAY ACT
The Equal Pay Act of 19631 is a broad, remedial amend-
ment to the Fair Labor Standards Act2 intended to eliminate
wage discrimination on the basis of sex.3 It prohibits employers
from remunerating male and female employees who perform
substantially equal work at different rates, unless the employer
can prove that the wage differential is based on a seniority
system, a merit system, a system which measures quantity or
quality of output, or the fourth exception, "any other factor
other than sex."4
Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc.5 was an action brought
under this Act in 1966 in which the Secretary of Labor asserted
that the Robert Hall Store of Greenbank Road, Wilmington,
Delaware, a wholly owned subsidiary of Robert Hall Clothes,
Inc., had been discriminating against saleswomen since June 13,
1964, by compensating them at a lower rate than salesmen even
though saleswomen and salesmen were performing equal work.6
The Greenbank Road store, which primarily sells fitted apparel,
7
is divided into two departments-one selling men's and boys'
clothing; the other, women's and girls' clothing.8 The merchan-
dise sold in the men's department is generally more expensive
and of better quality than that sold in the women's department.9
As a result, the men's department has recorded a larger dollar
1 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970). The Equal Pay Act states in part:
(1) No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section
shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are em-
ployed, between employees on the basis on sex by paying wages to employees in
such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to
employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which
are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is
made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential
based on any other factor other than sex ....
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970).
3 Hodgson v. Coming Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226, 228 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42
U.S.L.W. 3362 (U.S., Dec. 17, 1973). See generally Annot., 7 A.L.R.F. 707 (1971).
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970) (quoted in note 1 supra).
5473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973). For a brief discussion of
this case, see Note, 44 Miss. L.J. 1028 (1973).
6 473 F.2d at 592.
7 See Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1264, 1268 (D. Del. 1971),
rev'd., 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973).
8 473 F.2d at 590.
9Id.
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volume in gross sales, and a greater gross profit for every year of
the store's operation."0 At all times, only men have been em-
ployed to sell in the men's department, and only women in the
women's department.11 Salesmen have always received both a
higher starting wage and higher periodic increases than
saleswomen. 12 The Secretary of Labor contended that this pay
differential violated the Equal Pay Act with reference to all
female sales employees. The district court reached a mixed result
on this issue. It found no violation with regard to full-time
employees, but found that pay differentials for part-time em-
ployees did violate the Act. On appeal, 13 Robert Hall successfully
maintained the affirmative defense that the wage differential for
all employees was permissible, as it was exclusively based on the
difference in the profitability of the clothing sold by sexually
segregated sales personnel, a "factor other than sex."'
4
This decision is of significance in three respects. First, it
implies that in equal pay actions involving retail clothing estab-
lishments which limit the performance of certain jobs to a single
sex, a finding of noninterchangeability of job performance is
basic to a holding of no liability. Furthermore, an employer's
allegation of noninterchangeability will not be subject to close
judicial scrutiny. Second, by finding that varying average profits
among departments with sexually segregated sales personnel
justifies comparable wage differentials, the Third Circuit panel
introduced the most expansive judicial reading of the fourth
exception to the Equal Pay Act. Third, the court broke with
previous precedent and failed to require the employer to corre-
late pay differentials with individual performance, thereby les-
sening the employer's burden of showing nondiscrimination. By
thus deferring to the private determination of noninterchange-
ability and 'ailing to mandate equal pay scales for both sexes
performing the same work, the panel reached a result which
implies that the costs created by business policies catering to
perceptions of community sexual mores should be borne by the
female labor force, rather than the firm.
10 1d. at 591. See text accompanying note 54 infra.
11 473 F.2d at 591.
12 Id. at 592. See text accompanying note 54 infra.
'3 For a description of the procedural history of the case, see 473 F.2d at 592-93.
14 Id. at 592. In an action under the Equal Pay Act, the Secretary of Labor has the
burden of establishing a prima fade case of violation of the Act by demonstrating that
male and female employees are remunerated unequally for performing substantially
equal work. But once the Secretary has made this showing, the burden of proof switches
and the employer must prove that the wage differential is justified by one of the four
exceptions in order to escape liability. Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226,
231 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3362 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1973); Schultz v.
Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 266 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
CONCEALED SEX DISCRIMINATION
I. NONINTERCHANGEABILITY AS A PREREQUISITE TO
ESCAPING LIABILITY
The district court determined that the performance of male
and female sales jobs was noninterchangeable, finding that both
customers and salespeople would be embarrassed and sales
would be inhibited unless the sales personnel were of the same
sex as the customer.15 In reaching this conclusion, the court
accepted the defendant's assertion that the salesperson is fre-
quently required to be in close bodily contact with the customer
and to view customers in various states of undress in connection
with try-ons.16 This determination of noninterchangeability may
be viewed as a threshold issue, for if a job is found to be
susceptible to performance by both sexes, and the employer has
denied members of one sex the opporunity to work at it, then
the court would have no choice but to conclude that sex is a
factor in the job segregation. Such discrimination would violate
not only the Equal Pay Act, but Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 196417 as well, which is inpari materia with the Equal Pay Act.18
Robert Hall, the first equal pay litigation against a retail operation
which limits employment to a single sex within certain
departmerits, 19 indicates that regardless of what else a defendant
retailer is prepared to plead and prove, if it is unable to demon-
strate that jobs limited to one sex are noninterchangeable, it will
be held in violation of the Equal Pay Act.2 0
In light of the significance of this finding of noninter-
changeability, it is surprising that this issue was neither contested
by the Secretary on appeal2a nor closely scrutinized by the
district and appellate courts. It is unclear from either court
1' 326 F. Supp. at 1269. But see Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d
385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (197 1). The court in Diaz rejected Pan American's
assessment of the strength of customer preference and the dire consequences resulting
from ignoring this preference, in holding that discrimination against male cabin atten-
dants was not permissible under the bona fide occupational exception to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970), which is to be narrowly construed to
apply only in cases of necessity, not convenience.
"1326 F. Supp. at 1269.
1742 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
I See Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 266 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
905 (1970). See generally Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law III: Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGs L.J. 305 (1968).
19 Most litigation under the Equal Pay Act involves factory labor situations. See, e.g.,
Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970);
Schultz v. Saxonburg Ceramics, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D. Pa. 1973). Of the retail
operations involved in equal pay litigation, there has never been one which has limited
work within a single department to members of a single sex, although some have paid
unequal wages to men and women working at substantially equal jobs within the same
department. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 102 (M.D. Pa.
1971).
2 0 Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 800.114(a) (1973).
2 1 See 473 F.2d at 591.
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opinion why the sex of a salesperson is a bona fide occupational
qualification, to use the terminology of Title VII, justifying the
exclusion of women from higher paying jobs as a matter of
company policy. There was no finding that women have or have
not performed successfully in men's and boys' clothing depart-
ments in other companies. Nor was there any evidence that
practices less objectionable than a denial of female access to
higher paying jobs could not be equally effective in avoiding
embarrassing measurements near "private parts" and exposure
of customer's bodies.
The deference given to the employer's determination of the
tastes and inhibitions of his clientele is especially surprising in
light of a recent sex discrimination in employment case in the
Fifth Circuit. In Wallingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co.,
22
Judge Minor Wisdom's majority opinion found unacceptable a
firm's assertion that a male's hair length is sufficient to deny him
employment because it "would be offensive to the company [sic]
advertisers and customers and would injure the company's busi-
ness and good will in the community. '23 The decision was based
on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its provision which prevents
sex discrimination with respect to "compensation, terms, condi-
tions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
... sex." 4 Judge Wisdom recognized the bona fide occupational
exception to the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, but held
that customer taste could not create such an exception.2 5
In Robert Hall, the employer's assessment of the sexual
inhibitions of his clientele should have been given an equally
close scrutiny, especially if the congressional purpose of the
Equal Pay Act was to eliminate those "subjective assumptions and
traditional stereotyped misconceptions regarding the value of
woman's work.".26 Without further findings of fact in Robert Hall,
the judicial imprimatur on sexual segregation of opportunity
created by Robert Hall is inappropriate. As the discussion in
section III infra indicates, this threshold issue is also* the central
economic issue, for with a privately enforced noninterchange-
22 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir.), petition for rehearing en banc granted, 482 F.2d 542 (5th Cir.
1973).23 Id. at 537.
24 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
25 482 F.2d at 538. See Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (holding described in note 15 supra). Accord, 29
C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (1973).2 6 Shultz v. First Victoria Nat'l Bk., 420 F.2d 648, 656 (5th Cir. 1969). See 109 CoNG.
REc. 9212 (1963) (remarks of Representative Donahue); Murphy, Sex Discrimination in
Employment-Can We Legislate a Solution?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 437, 444 (1971):
Perhaps the most popular myth concerning women workers .. . involves
sex-typing, where women are thought incapable of performing certain jobs. The
evidence is quite clear that women can perform any job except that of sperm
donor, and it is only tradition, rather than job content, which has led to the
labelling of certain jobs as "for men only."
CONCEALED SEX DISCRIMINATION
ability policy, any judicial test of average gross profits will tend to
support sex differentials. However, tracing these wage differen-
tials back to this source is useful in determining who bears the
cost of catering to community social mores.
II. THE FOURTH EXCEPTION: DIFFERING PROFITS ACROSS
SEXUALLY SEGREGATED DEPARTMENTS AS A
JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENTIAL WAGES
Having found the sex segregation in Robert Hall legitimate,
the circuit court considered whether the pay differentials, al-
leged by Robert Hall to arise from differing market conditions in
each segregated department, were also legitimate. The Secretary
of Labor argued that a difference in profits from sexually
segregated departments, or "economic benefit," cannot be a
"factor other than sex" excusing the payment of unequal wages
for substantially equal work.27 In substance, the government
position was that, although the statutory. language of the fourth
exception is broadly framed--"a differential based on any other
factor other than sex"-both the structure of the Equal Pay Act
and its legislative history indicate that the fourth exception
should not be read so broadly as to include differences in
economic benefit to the employer. 8
Congress included three specific exceptions to the require-
ments of the Equal Pay Act under which unequal wages can be
paid to male and female employees without violating the statu-
tory ban on sex discrimination. 29 Each of these three exceptions
bears a direct relationship to individual job performance or
individual employee qualifications-the employee's experience,
ability, or production level. Relying upon Congressman Griffin's
statement before the House of Representatives that the first
three itemized exceptions "are really examples" of the types of
factors which could be taken into consideration in working out
the wage differentials under the fourth category, ° the Secretary
contended that the fourth exception similarly permits only dif-
ferences in compensation which reflect differences in individual
job performance or qualifications. 31
Robert Hall bases its wage differential on the difference in
gross profits between the men's and women's departments,3 2 a
difference primarily attributable to the generally higher price of
27473 F.2d at 593.
28 Brief for Plaintiff at 20-22, id.
20 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970).
30 109 CONG. Rac. 9203 (1963).
31 473 F.2d at 593. The Secretary's test would justify differentials based on "any
other factor other than sex which 'is related to job performance or is typically used in
settin wage scales.'
al. at 592.
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the merchandise sold in the men's department.3 3 Since the
difference in the gross profits of the two departments is com-
pletely unrelated to individual job performance or qualifications,
the Secretary argued that a wage differential based thereon
could not be justified under the fourth exception.
34
The court rejected this argument, holding that a gross profit
differential is a "factor other than sex" under the fourth excep-
tion and a permissible basis for wage differentiation between
sexually segregated departments. The opinion is based in part
on legislative history which indicated to the court that Congress
had no intention of denying the employer the option of un-
equally compensating employees of different sex who perform
equal work, provided that the employer's compensation policy is
based on a reason other than sex.35 The court noted that during
the legislative debate, Representative Goodell had asserted that
many factors can be considered by employers in determining
wages so long as pay differentials are based on these factors and
not on the sex of the employees. 36 Other speeches made during
the House debate also indicate that Congress intended that the
fourth exception include every reason for a wage differential
other than sex.37 Although the legislative history does not
specifically identify difference in economic benefit to the em-
ployer as a "factor other than sex" which could justify a wage
differential, the court determined that Congress intended that
the fourth exception be read broadly enough to include this
justification.
Moreover, the court looked to those regulations and
guidelines issued by the Department of Labor which recognize
that "factors of value" can constitute a valid basis for unequal
payment for apparently equal work, even though this results in
inequality between the sexes.38 The Wage Hour Administrator's
Interpretive Bulletin39 and the Field Office Handbook40 validate
the payment of different rates of commission for merchandise
sold in different departments within an establishment, when the
merchandise sold in the two departments differs in price, qual-
ity, markup, volume, turnover, or ease of selling. However,
3 See 326 F. Supp. at 1276.
34 473 F.2d at 593-94.35 Id. at 595.
" See 109 CONG. REc. 9206 (1963).
"See id. 9203 (1963) (remarks of Representative Griffin):
[E]ven though jobs involve the same skill, equal effort, equal responsibility, and
are performed under the same working conditions, if there is any other factor
not based on sex upon which a differential is based, then no violation of this law
can be found.
38473 F.2d at 594-95.
3 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(e) (1973).
40 WAGE & HOUR & PUBLIC CoNTRAcTs Divs., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FIELD OFFICE
HANDBOOK § 34do7 (1971).
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payment by commission is different from the base salary case
presented in Robert Hall. Commissions, by definition, are closely
related to individual effort, that factor which the Secretary
argued was unrecognized in Robert Hall's salary system. The
Department of Labor regulations also suggest that employment
on a night shift,41assignment to a temporary job,42 participation
in a bona fide training program,43 and employment in a part-
time capacity44 can all justify a wage differential under the
fourth exception. Although the court found the difference in the
"economic benefit" conveyed to the employer to be the unifying
factor rendering these wage differentials permissible, in each of
these examples any wage differential primarily reflects a differ-
ence in individual performance.
Thus, Robert Hall stands for the proposition that "economic
benefit" can justify a wage differential between sexes. Judge
Hunter's opinion for the court is the first explicit judicial state-
ment of this principle. Unfortunately it appears to be based on a
confusion in economic analysis. The court accepted as a measure
of economic benefit gross profit data, alleged to vary due to the
price structures of the segregated departments. However, the
regulations cited by the court in support of its position have
nothing to do with this price and demand phenomenon, but
rather relate most directly to individual worker performance.
III. THE PROFITS TEST: REDUCING THE EMPLOYER'S
BURDEN OF SHOWING NONDISCRIMINATION
Cases prior to Robert Hall indicated that, in addition to
showing that the factor upon which a wage differential was based
was of value to an employer,45 the employer had to make two
other showings. First, if men and women were treated as sepa-
rate classes for the purpose of this differential (for example, if all
male workers were paid more than all female workers because of
extra or different activities said to be performed by the males),
the employer had to prove that this separation was based upon
some legitimate classification other than sex. 6 Second, the em-
ployer was required to demonstrate that the differential in wages
paid to individual employees was reasonably related to the dif-
ferences in their individual performances.47
The figures necessary to make either of the above showings
41 29 C.F.R. § 800.145 (1973).
42Id. § 800.147.
43Id. § 800.148.
44Id. § 800.150.
" See Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 266 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
905 (1970); Schultz v. Saxonburg Ceramics. 314 F. Supp. 1139, 1146 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
4"See 421 F.2d at 267; 314 F. Supp. at 1146.
47See 421 F.2d at 266-67.
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usually cannot be derived from regular business and bookkeep-
ing records since these records generally focus on figures such as
departmental sales, profits, individual hours worked and wages
paid, and do not indicate variations in, or the utility of, indi-
vidual employee performance. 48 To prove the nondiscriminatory
nature of a sexual classification, the employer had to introduce
statistics demonstrating that virtually 100 percent of the male
and zero percent of the female employees performed the more
productive activity. 49 In most employment situations, the prep-
aration of such a statistical presentation would require interview-
ing each employee individually and determining whether the
employee was willing and able to perform the activity and
whether, in fact, the employee actually did so. 50 Proof of a
reasonable relationship between individual job performance and
wage differentials required assigning an economic value to the
work performed by each male and female employee, and show-
ing that the percentage difference in the4se values was closely
related to the percentage difference in the male and female wage
rates.51 Consequently, the cases decided prior to Robert Hall
indicate that in order to meet its burden of proof, an employer
must rely on proof derived from sources other than the regular
business and accounting records of the enterprise.
The Secretary of Labor argued that Robert Hall failed to
carry its burden of proving the economic benefits upon which
the wage differential was allegedly based. 2 The defendant relied
exclusively on group averages obtained from the regular busi-
ness and accounting records of the enterprise.5" It introduced
accounting records demonstrating that during the period
1963-1969, the men's department generated gross profits per
sales hour seventy-two percent to 134 percent greater than the
women's department, and that during the same period the wages
paid males exceeded those paid females by twenty-five percent to
fifty percent.
54
The appellate court determined that through the introduc-
tion of these records, Robert Hall had effectively shown that the
wage differential was based on a factor of value to the employer:
greater gross profits per hour. The district court's finding of
noninterchangeability of job performance indicated to the court
48 This is the case because figures focusing on the difference in, or the utility of,
individual performance are of little value to enterprises which remunerate employees on
the basis of an hourly wage or salary, and the vast majority of commercial enterprises in
this country employ one of these two systems. Cf. J. DOHR, E. PHILJPS, G. THOMPSON &
W. WARREN, AccOuNTING AND THE LAW 643-59 (3d ed. 1964).4 9 See 421 F.2d at 267; 314 F. Supp. at 1146.
50 See 421 F.2d at 259; 314 F. Supp. at 1139.
5' See 421 F.2d at 266-67.
52473 F.2d at 596-97.
53d. at 591 nn.1, 2.
54 Id.
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that the defendant had carried its burden of demonstrating that
a legitimate business justification for the job separation exists,
sufficient to dispel the notion that the separation was based on
sex. This showing did not demonstrate that a reasonable rela-
tionship exists between wage differentials and differences in
individual job performance. The court, however, held that since
Robert Hall had shown that it did not base its wage differential
on sex, it was not required to correlate the differential with
differences in individual performance. 55 Thus, the employer's
burden of proof in this type of equal pay case is considerably
reduced.
This reduction in the employer's burden of showing non-
discrimination by the use of a gross profits test is inappro-
priate for two reasons. First, an employer may be able to show
differentials in gross profits per sales hour among sexually
segregated departments and still be discriminating on the basis
of sex. Second, the use of this test masks the central issue of who
should bear the cost of private employment practices designed to
accede to customer tastes.
The gross profits measure used by Robert Hall is the differ-
ence between the total revenue from retail sales and the cost of
merchandise sold. The cost of merchandise and thus the gross
profits measure includes among other things sales labor costs.
Hence, the gross profits per sales hour differential between the
two departments could be attributable to factors other than the
differences in unit prices between the departments, which
Robert Hall uses as its justification for paying unequal wages.
One such factor is the nature of the firm's demand for its
labor force. The industrywide noninterchangeability policy
forces all women to work in the women's and girls' department
and prevents them from taking advantage of any opportunities
in the men's and boys' department. This restriction on female
job mobility artificially increases the supply of female labor,
reduces their productivity at the margin, and lowers their wage.
Depending on the nature of the firm's responsiveness to this
drop in wage (its wage elasticity of input demand), the amount
spent on female labor could decline and Robert Hall and other
retailers of women's apparel would tend to lower their prices
under normal competitive pressures resulting from the cost
reduction. Thus the artificially low women's wages induced by
the industrywide noninterchangeability policy would cause the
gross profit measure to decline in the women's and girls' de-
partment rather than reflect relatively lower gross profits in that
department.
However, in the men's and boys' department economic
5 5 Id. at 597.
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forces could be working to increase, rather than decrease gross
profits, and therefore widen the differential between depart-
ments relied upon by Robert Hall to show that the wage differ-
ential is unrelated to sex. The restriction on the supply of female
labor could artificially tend to raise the wages of the salesmen,
because the supply of labor to their department is less than it
would be in the absence of the noninterchangeability restriction.
If the response of this department's input demand (and that of
other similar departments of other retailers) to the rise in wages
is to incur higher men's labor costs resulting in higher retail
prices, then the gross profits of the department would increase
absolutely and relatively to the women's department.
Therefore, it is possible that the Robert Hall gross profit
differential is partially due to wage differencs traceable to the
industrywide noninterchangeability policy. In addition, from a
broader societal perspective it is also possible that the differential
is due to lower women's wages generally-traceable to past sex
discrimination in employment. Thus, the gross profit differential
would not be independent of the sex discrimination practiced by
Robert Hall and wage discrimination based on this measure
would be wage discrimination on the basis of sex and on its face
not within the fourth exception's "any other factor other than
sex." Since this issue was never discussed in any of the Robert Hall
opinions or briefs, it is unknown whether this analysis is actually
applicable to the case, but that is not critical here. The important
point is that such analysis might be applicable, and therefore the
courts' use of the gross profits test is incorrect because the
difference in gross profits may be partially a result of sex
discrimination and therefore would be an impermissible factor to
consider in setting wage rates. The courts should use such a test
only after the employer has clearly proven that it does not reflect
hidden sex discrimination.
IV. CONCLUSION
The appellate court's opinion observed that adoption of the
Secretary's position could force Robert Hall "toward a system
based totally upon commissions,' '5 6 thereby endangering the
prevailing system of compensation by salary. The Secretary, by
contrast, characterized the Third Circuit decision as one which
will threaten effective enforcement of the Equal Pay Act in the
entire retail sales industry.57 It is not apparent that either of
56 Id.
57 Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 11, Brennan v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 414
U.S. 866, denying cert. to 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1973).
A similar view is held by Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman who introduced a bill
in the House of Representatives, H.R. 12061, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973), soon after the
Robert Hall decision to amend the Equal Pay Act by depleting the "other factors" clause
completely. 119 CONG. REC. H 11909 (daily ed., Dec.- 20, 1973).
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these results will follow inevitably from the alternatives faced by
the court. However, this Comment has attempted to describe an
unfortunate failure of the court to find substantial support either
in law of in fact for what may be a sound legal principle-that
differing economic benefits to an employer may constitute a
valid basis for differentiating between the rates of pay of sexually
segregated personnel. Two conditions should be met before this
principle is applied, and these conditions were not satisfied in the
case at hand. First, there should be clear proof of the need for
segregation of the employees by sex. Second, the employer
should be required to prove that any wage differential is clearly
related to a difference in economic benefit to the employer, a
difference not attributable to any hidden sex discrimination.
Failure to meet these two conditions can result in a hidden
discrimination against the members of one sex, discrimination
which the Equal Pay Act of 1963, in conjunction with the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, was intended to prevent.
